A Sledge hammer. Or take it out to a gun range and let someone take it out with a .357.
If it is a 2.5" drive, it will shatter into many pieces, once smacked with a mini-sledge (5#'s). If it is a 3.5", take out the screws, remove the platters, keep the magnets, since they come in really handy for stuff at times. Then just toss the platters into a fire to roast them to their death.
I did. What I gave you is the way to keep anyone from recovering any information from a Hard drive. As for can anyone recover information from it. I can do it in less than two minutes with a Forensics program, which any law enforcement agency would use.
If you really did not expect an answer to your question, what did you intend from posting it on a computer forum.
broe23 said:
A Sledge hammer. Or take it out to a gun range and let someone take it out with a .357.
If it is a 2.5" drive, it will shatter into many pieces, once smacked with a mini-sledge (5#'s). If it is a 3.5", take out the screws, remove the platters, keep the magnets, since they come in really handy for stuff at times. Then just toss the platters into a fire to roast them to their death.
Removing the platter is enough to destroy the data :p
Any decent security program that overwrites a file or disk even once is proof against all software recovery methods. If you are able to see files after such a method was used then something went wrong. Often this would be user error.
A theoretical method of recovering files that have been overwritten was outlined in a paper published by Dr Peter Gutmann in 1996. In theory you could recover files by detecting the magnetic patterns that remained after the file was overwritten. Experiments have confirmed the theory but practical application is something entirely different. There have been unconfirmed reports that security agencies such as the FBI can actually do this. Those who may have this capability are not talking.
There is no firm evidence that any significant data has ever been recovered using Dr Gutmann's method. When devised it was nothing more than a theoretical possibility. The multiple pass security programs were "just in case" the method was viable.
Remember that the paper was written in 1996 when hard drive technology was very different than it is now. Dr. Gutmann himself is skeptical that his methods have any relevance with modern hard drives.
In any event the method (if it was ever viable) would require advanced hardware and knowledge. This could not be done with software alone.
Many organizations require physical destruction of storage media before disposal. But this isn't because software methods are not sufficiently reliable. It is matter of verifying the results. No great technical ability is required to physically destroy a drive and the results can be verified with a quick visual inspection. No so with software methods.
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